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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2a3(2)(k), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 and Supreme Court order of March 18, 1994
directing this case to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented on appeal are:
1.

Did the District Court err in adjudging that the provisions of Article

V entitled "Grievance Procedure" of the Professional Agreement entered into between
the Davis Education Association and the Davis County School District on August 18,
1992, constitute an arbitration agreement subject to the Utah Arbitration Act?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The question of whether or not the "Grievance Procedure" contained in
Article V of the Professional Agreement is an arbitration agreement subject to the Utah
Arbitration Act (the "Act") necessarily involves a legal interpretation of the Professional
Agreement and the Act and is not fact-dependent. Accordingly, the legal conclusion of
the District Court on this point should be reviewed for "correctness" and not be given
any special deference. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P. 2d 487 (Utah App., 1993);
Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P. 2d 1174 (Utah, 1989); Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v.
Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467 (Utah, 1989); State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah,
1994); Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1381 (Utah, 1993).
I

2. Did the District Court err in adjudging that Plaintiff waived his right
to arbitration?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
Determination of this issue is fact-dependent and the Findings of the
District Court should be reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard and all disputes
in the evidence must be reviewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination. Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah, 1985); State
v. Pena, supra; Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, supra; Re id v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
776 P.2d 896 (Utah, 1989); Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, supra; Gillmor
v. Gillmor, 745 P. 2d 461 (Utah App., 1987) Cert. Den. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah, 1980).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The Utah Arbitration Act, §§78-3la-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953
which Act is set forth verbatim in the Appendix to Appellee's Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

Appellant claimed the insurance program of the Davis County School
District was discriminatory as applied to him.

2

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Appellant filed a Complaint against the School District with the Utah AntiDiscrimination Division and received an adverse ruling. He then filed a Complaint
against the School District in the District Court. After the School District filed a Motion
to Dismiss with supporting Memorandum of Law, Appellant voluntarily dismissed the
Complaint. He then attempted to invoke the School District "Grievance Procedure".
When the School District refused to enter into a grievance procedure, Appellant filed a
Motion to Compel Arbitration.
C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT

The District Court granted the School District's Motion to Dismiss.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Appellee School District is a political subdivision of the State

of Utah organized and operating as a public school system pursuant to the constitutional
and statutory provisions applicable to school districts within the State of Utah. [R-51]
2.

The School District operates approximately seventy-five schools and

special facilities and employs approximately 4,500 people. There are approximately 230
married couples with both spouses working for the School District. The Appellant is an
employee of the School District whose spouse is also employed by the District. [R-52]
3. Prior to November 1, 1990, employees with a spouse also employed
by the District were allowed "internal coordination" of benefits for the entire family if
3

one employed spouse carried single coverage and the other employed spouse carried
family coverage. Beginning November 1, 1990, both employed spouses were required
to carry family coverage in order to have internal coordination of benefits for the entire
family.1 As a result of internal coordination, a study and analysis by the District and
its insurance advisor indicated that for the married couples where both spouses elected
to have family coverage, the District was paying a disproportionately higher premium for
the dollar value being received for the "second" policy. The District paid 85% of the
premium cost of the designated insurance plan to the insurance company for each of its
employees, including both spouses of married couples. [R-52, 53]
4. By requiring that one spouse be considered a "dependent", studies
indicated that the same coverage and medical benefits would be available to both spouses
and their family members without having to pay the full rate for the "second" policy.
Therefore, with no reduction in medical insurance benefits, the District would be able
to save approximately $250,000.00 annually. [R-53]
5. As a result of this review and analysis, beginning November 1, 1992,
following a process of collective bargaining with the Davis Education Association, the
Davis Classified Association and supported by the Insurance Committee of the District,
the so-called Insurance Coordination Program was eliminated. [R-53]

The term "internal coordination of benefits" means coverage under two or more group insurance
policies offered the employees by the same employer.

4

6.

Following elimination of the Insurance Coordination for Married

Couples, one spouse was to be designated by the married couple as the "employee" for
insurance purposes and the other spouse was considered as a dependent. If the married
couple did not designate who was considered the employee, the District put the coverage
under either:
A.

The most comprehensive program selected. For example, if one spouse
chose "family coverage" and the other chose "employee only", coverage
would be provided under the spouse who elected family coverage; or,

B.

The program selected by the spouse whose birthday fell first within the
calendar year. [R-53, 54]
7.

The District pays 85 % of the health insurance premium cost for the

designated plan for all employees, except married couples. For married couples, the
District pays 100% of the premium cost for the designated plan, [R-54]
8. If the married couple has a change in status of the "employee" spouse,
(for example, divorce, death, reduction in hours), resulting in no coverage, the
"dependent" spouse is able to enroll as a covered "employee" without meeting physical
examination or pre-existing condition requirements, assuming that there has not been a
break in coverage. For example, if one spouse is designated as the "employee" and the
other spouse is a "dependent", and the dependent spouse develops a condition which
should be described as a "pre-existing condition" during the coverage, and the parties
subsequently divorce or the other "employee" spouse dies, the pre-existing condition

5

requirements would not apply and the "dependent" spouse would continue to have
coverage. The "dependent" spouse would then become the "employee" designated to
carry the coverage. [R-54, 55]
9. On November 10, 1992, Appellant filed a complaint in the Office of
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial Commission of Utah (hereinafter
"UADD"). The UADD assigned the case to an Investigator to investigate the claims and
to attempt to resolve the claims or make a determination in accordance with the
requirements of Utah Code Annotated, §34-35-7. l(l)-(5). This procedure resulted in a
UADD "Determination" and "Order" of "No Reasonable Cause". [R-55, 261]
10. The School District was required to respond to the allegations by
providing information and legal memoranda and argument. [R-261]
11.

The final two paragraphs of the Determination gave notice that

Appellant had the option of review by requesting a hearing pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, §63-46b-12(l)(a) within thirty (30) days or by requesting reconsideration
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-13 within thirty (30) days. [R-55]
12. Appellant did not request either a hearing or reconsideration within
thirty (30) days. Simultaneously, the UADD Director issued an Order based on the
findings in the Determination. This "Order" also gave notice of the option to request a
formal hearing within thirty (30) days, see Exhibit "A".
Appellant. [R-56]

6

No request was made by

13. Appellant was a member of the Davis Education Association at the
time the Professional Agreement was negotiated and adopted.

Appellant signed a

Membership Enrollment Form. The Membership Enrollment Form contains a provision
which states:
I hereby designate and empower the local association
(DEA) as my exclusive bargaining agent. [R-56, 261]
14. On April 28, 1993, Appellant filed a Complaint in the District Court
of Davis County under the case of Reed et als. v. Davis County School District, et als.,
case number 930700114CN. [R-56]
15. The April 28, 1993 Complaint raised the same issues as those which
had been presented to and ruled upon previously by the UADD. [R-262]
16. The School District responded to that Complaint by filing a Motion
to Dismiss supported by a seventeen (17) page Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion to Dismiss. [R-56, 262]
17. On May 17, 1993, Appellant's representative, Executive Director of
the American Federation of Teachers, filed a request with the School District to receive
certain information in accordance with the Government Records Access and Management
Act (GRAMA). [R-56, 57]
18. Thereafter, on June 22, 1993, Appellant filed a Notice of Dismissal
under Rule 41(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R-57]
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19.

The School District spent considerable time and approximately

$20,000.00 in expense defending Appellant's UADD Charge, the lawsuit filed by
Appellant, and in providing a response to Appellant's GRAMA request. [R-57, 263]
20. The issues raised in the Plaintiff's UADD Charge and again in Reed
et als. v. Davis County School District et als,, are the same issues which Appellant now
seeks to have arbitrated. [R-57]
21.

Appellant initiated this action under the provisions of the Utah

Arbitration Act, §§78-31a-l, et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, by filing a Verified
Motion to Compel Arbitration. [R-256]
22. The Appellant contends that the "Grievance Procedure" of Article V
of the Professional Agreement entered into between the Davis County School District and
the Davis Education Association require arbitration and that the process is therefore
subject to the provisions of the Utah Arbitration Act. [R-256]
23.

The School District responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss

contending that Article V does not even mention the term "arbitration" and is not an
arbitration provision and that it is not covered by the Utah Arbitration Act, or in the
alternative that if Article V is covered by the Utah Arbitration Act, that Plaintiff has
waived his right to arbitration thereunder. [R-256, 257]
24. The Professional Agreement entered into by the Davis Education
Association and the Davis County School District provides in Article V thereof for a
Grievance Procedure, [R-257]
8

25. In Article V a grievance is defined as:
"A complaint by an educator or educators in Davis School
District

that

there

may

have

been

a

violation,

misinterpretation or inequitable application of any provision
in this agreement or other policies relating to the terms and
conditions of their employment."

[R-257, The entire

Professional Agreement is contained in Appendix to Brief
of Appellant/Plaintiff.

Article V, entitled "Grievance

Procedure" begins on p. 50]
26. Appellant was aware of the Grievance Procedure set forth in Article
V of the Professional Agreement. [R-261]
27. The Davis Education Association (DEA) entered into the Professional
Agreement with the Davis County School District on August 18, 1992. [R-260]
28. On May 28, 1993, some eight months after Appellant first raised the
issue, and after having submitted the matter to UADD, with an unfavorable result, and
after having filed a Complaint and served the same on the School District, the Appellant
took his first step to attempt to invoke the Grievance Procedure provided for in Article
V of the Professional Agreement. [R-262]
29. The School District refused to submit the matter to the Grievance
Procedure and the Appellant filed this action to compel arbitration pursuant to the Utah
Arbitration Act. [R-263]
9

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The School District and the Davis Education Association negotiated a
Professional Agreement containing Article V entitled "Grievance Procedure".

The

Grievance Procedure expresses the intent of the parties, is not ambiguous and contains
no reference to arbitration.

The District Court erred in finding that the Grievance

Procedure was an arbitration agreement. This was contrary to the intent of the parties
to the Professional Agreement.
Months before filing a grievance under the Professional Agreement,
Appellant filed Complaints with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and in the District
Court. This action prejudiced the School District and constitutes a waiver of whatever
right Appellant may have had to pursue a grievance proceeding.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING
THAT THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE CONTAINED
IN ARTICLE V OF THE
PROFESSIONAL
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DAVIS EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION AND THE DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT CONSTITUTES AN ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRATION ACT.
The Professional Agreement between the Davis County School District and
the Davis Education Association is a contract between those parties. It was created
through a process of bargaining and negotiation. Its written provisions memorialize the
"meeting of the minds" between the two organizations which formulated and created it.
10

The parties bargained for and created a "Grievance Procedure" as set forth in Article V
of the Professional Agreement. Appellant claims to derive an arbitration "right" from
the "Grievance Procedure" and yet the words "arbitrate" or "arbitration" are nowhere to
be found in the Grievance Procedure. As noted by the District Court, "....the terms
'arbitration' and 'grievance procedure' are not synonymous" [Findings of Fact, Finding
No. 9; R-258]. Nevertheless, the District Court found that the parties intended the
Grievance Procedure to be an arbitration agreement.

The Professional Agreement

contains absolutely no provision which supports the conclusion that the parties intended
to enter into any agreement which provided for an arbitration process.

Exactly the

opposite is, in fact, true. The parties knew the difference between a grievance process
and arbitration. If they had wanted to provide for arbitration, they would have so stated
in the Professional Agreement. It is pointedly relevant that the parties designated the
procedures contained in Article V as "Grievance Procedure" and not as an arbitration
process. If they had intended to provide for arbitration, why would they have called it
"grievance" instead of "arbitration"?
The District Court found that the provisions set forth in Article V of the
Professional Agreement"

appear to be a combination of procedures which are typical

of a grievance procedure and also those which are typical of an arbitration provision".
[Findings of Fact No. 12; R-259]

The District Court further found that it was the

general attitude of the courts and the purpose of the Utah Arbitration Act to encourage
procedures which foster methods of dispute resolution and reduce costs and the time
11

associated with formal litigation [Findings of Fact No. 14; R-259] and "to hold that the
provisions of Article V of the Professional Agreement do not constitute arbitration as
contemplated by the Utah Arbitration Act would be to put form above substance and
frustrate the obvious intent of the Legislature and would fly in the face of sound judicial
reasoning". [Findings of Fact No. 14, 15; R-259] The Court held that the provisions
of Article V of the Professional Agreement are an arbitration agreement subject to the
Utah Arbitration Act. [Findings of Fact No. 16; R-259]

These are findings of the

District Court which should be reviewed for correctness and no deference should be
accorded to such findings.
There was no basis or reason to support the District Court's Finding and
Judgment that the Grievance Procedure was intended to be an arbitration agreement. The
issue does not turn upon what the intent of the Legislature was in adopting the Utah
Arbitration Act. The intent of the Legislature is irrelevant in this context. What is
relevant is what the intent of the parties was in entering into the Professional Agreement
which included Article V entitled "Grievance Procedure". There was no reason for the
District Court to speculate as to what the parties to the Professional Agreement intended.
In interpreting a Contract, the Court should first look to the four corners of the
agreement to determine the intentions of the parties, Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9 (Utah
App. 1994), Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah, 1989),
Atlas Corporation v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah, 1987), Stanger v.
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Sentinel Security Life Insurance Company. 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah, 1983).

As the

Supreme Court stated in Stanger:
To preserve the sanctity of written instruments, the intent
of the parties to a written integrated contract should be
found within the four corners of that instrument.
6 6 9 P . 2 d a t p . 1205.
If the contract is in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the
intention of the parties must be determined from the words of the agreement, Winegar
v. FroererCorp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah, 1991).
The use of extrinsic evidence, in this case the District Court's speculation,
is permitted only if the document appears incompletely to express the parties' agreement
or if it is ambiguous in expressing that agreement, Wade v. Stangl, supra, Ron Case
Roofing and Asphalt v. Blomquist, supra, Atlas Corporation v. Clovis National Bank,
supra,

Kimball v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah, 1985).

In this case, the

Grievance Procedure is complete within its "four corners" and does not appear
incompletely to express the intention and agreement of the parties. Furthermore, the
Grievance Procedure is not ambiguous. It contains a full and complete grievance process
and there was no reason or basis for the District Court to conclude that when the parties
said they wanted to have a Grievance Procedure, what they really meant and intended
was that they wanted to have an arbitration agreement subject to the Utah Arbitration
Act.
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The Utah Arbitration Act specifically requires as a prerequisite to
arbitration a showing that there exists a "written arbitration agreement", §78-3la-3, §7831a-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The intent of the parties should not be inferred or
implied. The intention of the parties to submit their dispute to conclusive determination
by a contractually designated agent, i.e. an arbitrator, should be made manifest by plain
language, United States v. Moorman. 330 U.S. 457, 70 S.Ct. 288, 94 L.Ed. 256 (1950),
State Highway Commission v. Brasel & Sims Construction Company, Inc., 688 P.2d 871
(Wyoming, 1984).

As observed, in the present case the words "arbitration" and

"arbitrate" are not even used in the Grievance Procedure described in Article V of the
Professional Agreement nor is there any reference to the Utah Arbitration Act.
The Utah Arbitration Act provides procedures through which parties may
require arbitration of a dispute. Where an arbitration agreement exists, the Court shall
order the parties to arbitrate.

However, §78-3la-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

specifically states:
A written agreement to submit any existing or future
controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable and
irrevocable
[Emphasis added.]
No such written agreement exists.
Appellant bases his claim to arbitration on Article V of the Professional
Agreement. That Article outlines the grievance procedure to be followed when a

14

professional employee feels aggrieved.

However, Article V makes no mention

whatsoever of any right to arbitration or any other right which could be construed as
such.
The Supreme Court of Oregon considered circumstances very similar to
those now presented to the Court. In the case of Van Eck v. Oregon State Employees
Association, 574 P.2d 633 (Oregon, 1978), the Court held:
It is elementary that an agreement by parties for the
"arbitration" of a controversy necessarily involves an
agreement to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final
and binding on both parties. [Citing authorities.] This is
also implicit in the terms of ORS 33.210, in providing that
'[a] 11 persons desiring to settle by arbitration any
controversy' may 'submit their differences to the award *
* * of any person or persons mutually selected' and also by
the terms of ORS 33.310 in providing for entry of a
judgment based upon such an arbitration award.
The contract provision in this case does not provide for an
award that is final and binding on both parties. Instead, it
provides that the "action of the Appeal Board shall be final
and binding on the Association." Because the employee
involved is not also bound by such "action," but is free to
seek any other available remedy, it follows that this
contract provision is not an agreement for arbitration within
the terms of ORS 33.210. It also follows that the trial
court did not err in finding that this grievance and appeal
procedure did not "fit" the "true definition of arbitration"
and in refusing to consider plaintiffs complaint as a
proceeding under ORS 33.230 to enforce an agreement for
arbitration. [Emphasis in original.]
In the present case, Step 3 of the Grievance Procedure found in §5.4 of
the Professional Agreement provides that the educator may submit the grievance to a
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hearing examiner. The language of Step 4 is determinative in view of Van Eck and the
authorities cited therein. Step 4 reads:
If the educator is not satisfied with the decision rendered in
Step 3, the educator and/or his/her chosen representative
may request and be granted a hearing before the Board of
Education in executive session. Following an executive
session the Board will render its decision in an open
meeting. Nothing herein shall be construed to limit the
right of the District or the educator to appeal to an
appropriate court of law. [Emphasis added.]
Therefore, it is impossible under elementary rules of law to consider the
Grievance Procedure provided for in Article V as an "arbitration" process. In order to
have an arbitration process, both parties must agree that the decision of the arbitrator will
be final and binding. Step 4 makes it clear that if the educator is not satisfied with the
decision rendered in Step 3, that he/she has a right to appeal and be granted a hearing
before the Board of Education which is not obliged to accept the decision of the "hearing
examiner".

Furthermore, Step 4 also provides that under the Article V Grievance

Procedure, either the educator or the School District has a right to appeal to an
appropriate court of law.

These procedures outlined in Step 4 are fundamentally

incompatible with the concept of arbitration.
Accordingly, the provisions of the Utah Arbitration Act are completely
irrelevant to Appellant's claim and he has no legal basis, right or authority to seek a
remedy under the provisions of the Utah Arbitration Act. The decision of the District
Court should be reversed on this issue.

16

POINT II
APPELLANT HAS PARTICIPATED IN
PRIOR LEGAL ACTIONS TO A POINT
INCONSISTENT WITH INTENT TO
ARBITRATE,
RESULTING IN
PREJUDICE TO THE SCHOOL DISTRICT
AND AS A RESULT, APPELLANT HAS
WAIVED WHATEVER RIGHT, IF ANY,
HE MAY H A V E H A D
TO
ARBITRATION.
In Soter's. Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan. 857 P.2d 935 (Utah,
1993), the Court specifically upheld and approved Phoenix Insurance Company v. Heath,
61 P.2d 308 (Utah, 1936) and American Savings & Loan Association v. Blomquist, 445
P.2d 1 (Utah, 1968). Based on those earlier cases, Soter's. Inc. specifically reiterated
the three elements necessary to show waiver. They are:
1.

An existing right, benefit or advantage.

Whatever rights Appellant may have had, he knew what they were because
they were fully outlined and set forth in writing in the Professional Agreement.
The second element is:
2.

Knowledge of the existence of such right benefit or advantage.

For the reasons just stated, Appellant was well-aware of whatever rights
he may have had.
The third element is:
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3.

An intention to relinquish the right.

There is, of course, no written statement from Appellant saying "I hereby
relinquish my right". However, such explicitness is not required by the law. Soter's,
Inc. held, citing Phoenix, that any waiver "must be distinctly made, although it may be
express or implied" [emphasis added]. In assessing whether or not waiver has occurred,
Soter's, Inc. also stated that:
In other words, we indicated that a fact finder should
assess the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the relinquishment is clearly intended.
[Emphasis added.] Citing Parks v. Zions First National
Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah, 1983), Morgan v. Ouailbrook
Condominium, Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah, 1985) and
Barnard v. Wassermann, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 855 P.2d
243 (Utah, 1993).
What are the "totality of the circumstances" in this case? To paraphrase
the language of the Court in American Savings & Loan Association v. Blomquist, supra,
through no tortuous process of reasoning can we conclude that Appellant's actions did
not imply a waiver of his right to file a grievance. Appellant's bargaining agent, the
Davis Education Association, entered into a Professional Agreement with the School
District on August 18, 1992. The insurance program which Appellant complains of was
included in that Professional Agreement.

The Professional Agreement also included

Article V, entitled "Grievance Procedure". Appellant made no effort to file a Grievance
Procedure. Instead, on November 10, 1992, he filed a Complaint with the Utah AntiDiscrimination Division (UADD).

On March 24, 1993 the UADD issued a
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"Determination" and "Order" finding and ruling against Appellant and indicating that
there was "No Reasonable Cause" for his Complaint. On April 28, 1993, Appellant filed
a Complaint in the District Court of Davis County under the case name of Reed et als.
v. Davis County School District et als.. Case No. 930700114CN. The School District
responded to the Complaint by filing a Motion to Dismiss with a Memorandum of Points
and Authorities dated May 4, 1993. Thereafter, Appellant filed a Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal under Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. By this time, including
Administrator's time, secretarial time and attorney's fees, the School District had
expended in excess of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) defending against the
claims which Appellant had filed with UADD and the Complaint which he had filed in
the District Court. Then, on May 21, 1993, for the first time, Appellant submitted a
letter to the School District seeking to invoke a Step 1 grievance procedure in accordance
with the Professional Agreement. Therefore, Appellant's first attempt to invoke the
Grievance Procedure came more than nine (9) months after the Professional Agreement
with its insurance program was adopted, more than six (6) months after he filed his
Complaint with UADD, and nearly one (1) month after filing his first lawsuit in the
District Court. Also see National Foundation for Cancer Research v. A. G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 261 U.S. App. D.C. 284 and S&H Contractors, Inc. v. A.
J. TaftCoalCo.,Inc. 906 F.2d 1057, cert. den. 112 L.Ed 2d 669 as to issue of wavier.
Appellant is not unlike the Plaintiff in Barnard v. Wassermann, supra, in
that he voluntarily relinquished his right to file a grievance and chose to file with UADD
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and with the District Court. Like Barnard, he chose to "take care of it in another way"
rather than to file a grievance.
In view of these facts, it is clear that the School District has been
prejudiced by Appellant's actions.
Grievance procedures are established by parties exactly for the purpose of
avoiding time and expense such as Appellant has caused himself and the School District
to incur. If he had initiated the Grievance Procedure machinery after the 1992-1993
Professional Agreement was adopted on August 18, 1992, or at least had used it before
filing with UADD, the issues could possibly have been resolved.

The Grievance

Procedure may have resulted in a hearing before the Board of Education and a solution
may have been arrived at by the Board. We can only speculate now as to what might
have occurred if Appellant had utilized the Grievance Procedure, because he chose to
ignore that procedure completely. As stated in Barnard v. Wassermann, supra:
Barnard argues that he did not waive his objections to
Judge Murphy's Order when he declined a hearing and
chose to pursue the matter in a different way.

Instead, he voluntarily relinquished the pre-deprivation
process offered to him prior to entry of the Order when he
rejected the opportunity to have a hearing on his
objections.
Barnard's request for a hearing on his objections indicates
his knowledge of his constitutional rights. We presume
that as an attorney, Barnard was aware of the consequences
of his decision to pursue alternative channels to air his
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objections. Furthermore, his desire to take care of the
matter "in another way" suggests that he considered the
various means of voicing his objections and chose a legal
remedy other than the requested hearing. However, by so
choosing, he waived his right to further consideration of
those claims.
Similarly, by rejecting the Grievance Procedure provided for in the
Professional Agreement and choosing to handle the matter "in another way", that is by
filing with UADD and in the District Court, Appellant has waived any claim to invoke
the Grievance Procedure at this late date.

Appellant's chosen course of conduct is

certainly inconsistent with an intent to utilize the grievance process.
As noted in Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah,
1992) the policies favoring arbitration are largely defeated when the right of arbitration
is not raised until an opposing party has undertaken much of the expense necessary to
prepare a case for trial. Appellant shopped his case in two forums prior to filing his
Complaint in this case and he caused the School District to incur substantial expense in
the defense of the prior actions.
The School District has spent a lot of time and money on this matter which
may have been avoided if Appellant had tried to use the grievance process earlier. The
totality of the circumstances inescapably leads to the conclusion that Mr. Reed chose his
forum, tried to make his case there, failed to do so, and now tries to fall back on the
grievance process, which he could have pursued in the first place.
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With respect to the issue of the Affidavits which Appellant claims were
improperly received by the District Court, Appellant has failed to show that he was
prejudiced by their receipt. In fact, Appellant has admitted in his Statement of Facts all
elements upon which the District Court based its decision that Appellant waived whatever
right, if any, he may have had to engage in arbitration. For example, Appellant admits
that in November, 1992, he filed a Complaint with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division
and received an unfavorable ruling (Appellant's Brief, p. 5); that on April 28, 1993,
Appellant filed a Complaint in the District Court of Davis County against the Davis
County School District (Appellant's Brief, p. 6); that on May 17, 1993, Appellant's
representative asked the School District for certain information under the Government
Records Access Management Act (Appellant's Brief, p. 6); that on May 21, 1993,
Appellant requested a formal grievance in compliance with the 1992-1993 Professional
Agreement (Appellant's Brief, p. 7); that on June 4, 1993, the School District filed a
Motion to Dismiss Appellant's First Complaint and that on June 22, 1993, Appellant
voluntarily dismissed his Complaint after the School District had filed a Motion to
Dismiss (Appellant's Brief, pp. 8, 9).
The Affidavit of Mel Miles, Director of Human Resources of the School
District (R. 164-170, Appellee's Appendix) was made on the basis of personal
knowledge, with the exception of one statement upon information and belief to the effect
that Appellant was a member of the Davis Education Association when the Professional
Agreement was negotiated. This statement has never been denied. All other statements
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pertaining to the matter, including the time and expense incurred by the School District
in responding to Appellant's charges before the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and
the District Court were made by Mr. Miles in his Affidavit based on personal
knowledge. He would have been competent to testify as to those matters.
In a case involving submission of Affidavits, the Utah Supreme Court
stated in Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety. 854 P.2d 527 (Utah, 1993):
The objectionable statements consist of legal arguments and
conclusions and did nothing more than supplement the
arguments made in plaintiff's memorandum. We fail to see
how this prejudiced defendants.
854 P.2d at p. 533
In the present case, Appellant was not prejudiced or harmed by the
Affidavits because either:

(1) Appellant has included the same statements in his

statement of facts, (2) statements contained in the Affidavits did nothing more than
supplement the arguments made by the School District, or (3) the statements in the
Affidavits were made on the basis of personal knowledge. Even if the District Court
should not have refused to strike the Affidavits, this was a harmless error.

By

Appellant's own admission, the facts relevant to this Appeal are undisputed and Appellant
does not rely on the District Court's consideration of matters outside the pleadings as a
primary basis for his appeal, (Appellant's Brief, p. 13, footnote 10). The question of the
Affidavits is really a non-issue which should have no bearing on the outcome of this
Appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The Professional Agreement contains Article V which describes a
"Grievance Procedure".

There is no use or mention of the term "arbitrate" or

"arbitration". The Grievance Procedure described in the Professional Agreement cannot
be considered an arbitration agreement because it lacks the essential legal requirements
to constitute an arbitration agreement. In an arbitration agreement the parties agree that
a matter will be submitted to an arbitrator and that the arbitrator's decision will be final.
The Article V Grievance Procedure provides in Step 3 that the grievance may be
submitted to a hearing examiner. However, if the educator is not satisfied with the
decision of the hearing examiner, an appeal may be taken to the Board of Education and
thereafter either party may "appeal to an appropriate court of law". (Appendix to Brief
of Plaintiff/Appellant, tab "A", page 51).

The process outlined in the Grievance

Procedure is fundamentally different from and in conflict with the concept of an
arbitration agreement.

The Judgment of the District Court on this point should be

reviewed for legal correctness and this court should find that the School District and the
Davis Education Association never intended the Grievance Procedure to be an arbitration
agreement and that the Grievance Procedure is not an arbitration agreement.

The

Judgment of the District Court on this point should be overruled.
With respect to the issue of wavier, if this Court finds that the Grievance
Procedure does not constitute an arbitration agreement, the question of waiver becomes
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moot. If this Court feels constrained, however, to hold that the Grievance Procedure is
an arbitration agreement, then the Findings of Fact made by the District court should not
be disturbed and this Court should hold that Appellant's actions prior to requesting a
grievance proceeding were inconsistent with that process and that he had waived any
right to pursue the matter by grievance or arbitration. The District Court's Judgment on
that point should then be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of June, 1994.
KING & KING

FELSHAW KING, Bfauire
Attorneys for Appellefe/GfetfS-Appellant
Davis County School District
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE, postage prepaid, to:
Terry E. Welch, Esquire
Mark F. James, Esquire
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
Attorneys at Law
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P. O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
DATED this 10th day of June, 1994.

S:Reed.Bri
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
of
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GARY E. REED,
FINDINGS OF FACT
and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs .
DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.

Civil No. 930700200CV
Judge Rodney S. Page

The above-entitled matter came on regularly to be
heard on Tuesday, October 12, 1993, on Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel Arbitration and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with the
Honorable Rodney S. Page, District Judge presiding.

Plaintiff

appeared in person and by his legal counsel, Mark F. James,
Esquire and Terry E. Welch, Esquire.

Defendant appeared by

Felshaw King, Esquire, legal counsel for the Davis County
School District.

The Court heard the oral

arguments of

Counsel for both parties and took the matter under advisement.
The Court

fully and carefully considered all of the

pleadings on file herein, the Memoranda of Law submitted by
the parties and the oral arguments of the parties and based
KING & KING
LAWYERS
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thereon

issued the Court's Ruling dated November 9, 1993.

As directed by the Court in its Ruling, Counsel for
Defendant thereafter submitted proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and accompanying Judgment.

Counsel for

Plaintiff

to

responded

by

filing

an

"Objection

Proposed

Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law", "Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss" and "Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider
Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss".
filed

"School

District

Response

The Defendant then

to Objection

to

Proposed

Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law", "Objections to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Ruling
on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss" and "Defendant's Memorandum
of Law in Opposition to Motion to Reconsider".
The

Court

reviewed

and

considered

all

of

the

aforementioned pleadings and issued a "Ruling on Plaintiff's
Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss"
dated December 29, 1993 in which Ruling Plaintiff's Motion to
Reconsider was denied.
Thereafter, Defendant

submitted

revised

proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a revised proposed
Judgment.

Plaintiff again filed an "Objection to Proposed

Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law" with a Memorandum.

Defendant responded with a "Response

to Objection" and a Memorandum.
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The

Court

reviewed

and

considered

all

of

the

pleadings regarding the second Objection and issued a "Ruling
on

Plaintiff's

Objections

to

Proposed

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Judgment" dated January 31, 1994 in
which

Plaintiff's

Objections

were

denied

and

Defendant's

Counsel was directed to submit the original Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment to the Court for signature.
The Court now being fully advised in the premises
does

hereby

make

and

enter

its

Findings

of

Fact

and

under

the

Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff

initiated

this

action

provisions of the Utah Arbitration Act, §§78-31a-l, et sea. ,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, by filing a Verified Motion to
Compel Arbitration.
2.

The Plaintiff contends that the provisions of

Article V of the Professional Agreement entered into between
the Davis County School District
Association

require

arbitration

and the Davis
and

that

the

Education

process

is

therefore subject to the provisions of the Utah Arbitration
Act.
3.

Defendant

responded

by

filing

a Motion

to

Dismiss contending that since Article V does not mention the
term "arbitration" it is not strictly an arbitration provision
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and that it is not covered by the Utah Arbitration Act, or in
3

the alternative that if Article V is covered by the Utah
Arbitration

Act,

that

Plaintiff

has waived

his

right

to

arbitration thereunder.
4.
Davis

The Professional Agreement entered into by the

Education

District

Association

provides

in Article

and
V

the

Davis

thereof,

County

for

a

School

Grievance

Procedure.
5.

In Article V a grievance is defined as:

"a complaint by an educator or educators
in Davis School District that there may
have been a violation, misinterpretation
or
inequitable
application
of
any
provision in this agreement or other
policies relating to the terms and
conditions of their employment.
6.

The Grievance Procedure referred to in Article

V requires that the aggrieved person first discuss the matter
informally with his/her principal;

if not thereby resolved,

the person may then invoke a formal grievance procedure.

This

formal procedure involves a written grievance signed and dated
by the complainant.

It requires a meeting with the principal

and a written decision by the principal.

If the person is not

satisfied by that meeting, the grievance is forwarded to the
superintendent and he is required to meet with the aggrieved
person and to make a written decision.

If the person is not

satisfied with that decision, the person may request that the
matter be submitted to a hearing examiner agreed to by the
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parties.

The hearing examiner will then make a recommendation

to the Board of Education and the aggrieved person in an
Executive Session.
with

that

If the aggrieved person is not satisfied

recommendation,

the person may

then

request

a

hearing before the entire Board of Education in Executive
Session.

The Board of Education must then make a decision in

an open meeting.
7.

Nothing in the Grievance Procedure shall be

construed to limit the right of the School District or the
grievant to appeal to an appropriate court of law if they are
not satisfied with the decision of the Board of education.
8.

The Utah Arbitration Act does not define the

term "arbitration".
9.

It is clear that the terms "arbitration" and

"grievance procedure" are not synonymous.
10.

The

term

"grievance

procedure"

has

to

do

primarily with the procedures for resolving complaints between
employees and employer that contemplates a system of face-toface discussion between the employer and the employee to
resolve a difference.
11.
quasi-judicial

The term "arbitration" refers to a more formal
procedure

of

dispute

resolution

by

an

independent party agreed to by those involved.
12 .
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Professional

The provisions as set forth in Article V of the
Agreement

appear

to

be

a

combination

of

procedures which are typical of a grievance procedure and also
those which are typical of an arbitration provision.
13 .
the

Davis

It was the intent of the Board of Education and

Education

regarding

Association

allegations

of

to

violation,

set

up

a

procedure

misrepresentation

or

inequitable application of the provisions of the Professional
Agreement

or

conditions

of

other
their

policies

relating

employment

as

to

the

terms

an alternate

to

and
legal

proceedings.
14.

The general attitude of the Courts and the

obvious purpose of the Utah Arbitration Act is to encourage
those procedures which foster methods of dispute resolution
which reduce the costs and the time associated with formal
litigation.
15.
Professional

To hold that the provisions of Article V of the
Agreement

do

not

constitute

arbitration

as

contemplated by the Utah Arbitration Act would be to put form
above

substance

Legislature

and

frustrate

and would

fly

the

obvious

in the face of

intent
sound

of

the

judicial

reasoning.
16.

The provisions of Article V of the Professional

Agreement are an arbitration agreement and are subject to the
Utah Arbitration Act.
17.
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Utah

courts

have

defined

intentional relinquishment of a known right.
6

waiver

as

the

18.

To constitute waiver, there must be an existing

right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence and
an intention to relinquish it.
19.

The

intent

to

extinguish

a

right

must

be

20.

In deciding the issue of waiver, the court need

distinct.

only

determine

whether

the

totality

of

the

circumstance

warrants the inference of relinquishment.
21.

In

applying

the

concept

of

waiver

to

arbitration clauses, Utah courts have expanded on that concept
somewhat

by

requiring

not

only

a

finding

of

intent

to

relinquish the right to arbitrate, but also that the other
party has been prejudiced thereby,
22.
among

other

Prejudice to the other party may be shown,
things,

by

an

additional

advantage

to

the

requesting party by participating in pre-trial procedures or
similar activities; by forum shopping

(where the party has

previously submitted the matter to the discretionary powers of
a court) ; or by causing the other party to spend time and
resources that the arbitration procedure is designed to limit
or eliminate.
23.

In

the

Education Association

matter

here

(DEA) entered

in

dispute,

into the

the

Davis

Professional

Agreement with the Davis County School District on August 18,
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1992.
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24.

The Plaintiff herein was a member of the DEA

and appointed the DEA as his bargaining agent and ratified the
Professional Agreement.
25.

Plaintiff was aware of the Grievance Procedure

set forth in Article V of the Professional Agreement.
26.

By letter dated September 19, 1992, addressed

to the School District Superintendent, Plaintiff expressed
concern over the health care provision which he claimed was
discriminatory against married couples working for the School
District.
27.

Subsequently, on November 10, 1992, Plaintiff,

along with certain other employees, filed a Complaint with the
Utah Anti-Discrimination Division
health

(UADD) claiming that the

insurance benefit plan of the School District

was

discriminatory based on marital status, sex, and gender by
association.
28.

The School District was required to respond to

said allegations by providing information and legal memoranda
and argument.
29.
arguments,

After

UADD

considering

issued

a

the

facts

Determination

and

the

adverse

to

legal
the

Plaintiff on March 24, 1993.
30.

On April 28, 1993 Plaintiff filed a Complaint

against the Davis County School District, et als., in the
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District Court of Davis County, State of Utah, designated as
8

\

n \3

Civil

No.

93 0700114

and

had

a

Summons

and

copy

of

the

Complaint served on the School District.
31.

The

Complaint

alleged,

among

other things,

violation of the "Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act" , §§34-35-1, et
seq. , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the Utah Constitution
claiming unlawful

discrimination

on the basis

of gender,

gender by association and marital status.
32.

The April 28, 1993, Complaint raised the same

issues as those which had been presented to and ruled upon
previously by the UADD.
33.

The School District responded to the Complaint

by filing a Motion to Dismiss and a Memorandum of Law in
support of the Motion to Dismiss.
34.

On

May

28,

1993,

some

eight

months

after

Plaintiff first raised the issue, and after having submitted
the matter to UADD, with an unfavorable result, and after
having filed a Complaint and served the same on the School
District, the Plaintiff took his first step to attempt to
invoke the Grievance Procedure provided for in Article V of
the Professional Agreement.
35.

On June 22, 1993, after Defendant had responded

to Plaintiff's Complaint in the District Court with a Motion
to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law, the Plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed his Complaint in the District Court.
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36.

The School District, up to that point, had

expended monies to the extent of $20,000.00 to respond to the
allegations of the Plaintiff before the UADD and the District
Court.
37.

The

School

District

refused

to

submit

the

matter to the Grievance Procedure and the Plaintiff filed this
action to compel arbitration pursuant to the Utah Arbitration
Act.
38.

The Plaintiff, by filing his Complaint with

UADD and receiving a disfavorable recommendation, by then
filing a Complaint in the District Court raising the same
issues and by waiting some eight months after the dispute
arose before attempting to invoke the Grievance Procedure has
shown a clear intent to pursue a remedy by alternative means.
39.

The actions of Plaintiff have prejudiced the

Defendant, Davis County School District.
40.

Plaintiff's Motion to exclude the Affidavit of

Mr. Mel Miles should be denied.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
does now make and enter its Conclusions of Law as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff's Motion to exclude the Affidavit of

Mr. Mel Miles should be denied.
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2.
Proposed

Plaintiff's

Judgment

and

first

to

and

Proposed

second

Objections

Findings

of

to

Fact

and

should

be

Conclusions of Law should be denied.
3.

Plaintiff's Motion

to Reconsider

4.

The provisions of Article V of the Professional

denied.

Agreement constitute an arbitration agreement which is subject
to the Utah Arbitration Act.
5.

That

Plaintiff

has

waived

his

right

to

arbitration in this matter.
6.

That Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be

granted with prejudice.
Let Judgment be entered accordingly.
DATED this

3r<^

day of February, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

RODNEY a j PAGE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW to:
Terry E. Welch, Esquire
Mark F. James, Esquire
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
Attorneys at Law
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P. O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
postage prepaid, this

^

day of February, 1994.

Secretary

S:Reed.fof
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
of
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GARY E. REED,
J U D G M E N T

Plaintiff,
vs .
DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Civil No. 930700200CV
Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly to be
heard by the Court on Tuesday, October 12, 1993, on
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss with the Honorable Rodney S. Page,
District Judge, presiding.

Plaintiff was present in person

and represented by his attorneys, Mark F. James, Esquire,
and Terry E. Welch, Esquire.

Defendant was represented by

its attorney Felshaw King, Esquire.

At that time the Court

heard the oral arguments of Counsel for the respective
parties and took the matter under advisement.

Thereafter,

the Court duly considered all of the pleadings, memoranda,
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and oral arguments of the parties and issued its ruling on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated November 9, 1993.

a \j

As directed by the Court in its Ruling, Counsel
for Defendant thereafter submitted proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and accompanying Judgment.

Counsel

for Plaintiff responded by filing an "Objection to Proposed
Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law", "Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss" and "Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider
Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss".

The Defendant

then filed "School District Response to Objection to
Proposed Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law", "Objections to Plaintiff's Motion to
Reconsider Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss" and
"Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to
Reconsider".
The Court reviewed and considered all of the
aforementioned pleadings and issued a "Ruling on Plaintiff's
Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss" dated December 29, 1993 in which Ruling Plaintiff's
Motion to Reconsider was denied.
Thereafter, Defendant submitted revised proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a revised
proposed Judgment.

Plaintiff again filed an "Objection to

Proposed Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law" with a Memorandum.
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Defendant responded

with a "Response to Objection" and a Memorandum.
2
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The Court reviewed and considered all of the
pleadings regarding the second Objection and issued a
"Ruling on Plaintiff's Objections to Proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment" dated January 31,
1994 in which Plaintiff's Objections were denied and
Defendant's Counsel was directed to submit the original
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment to the
Court for signature.
The Court has made and entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Based upon the foregoing, and

the Court now being fully advised in the premises and good
cause appearing therefor, it is now hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion to exclude the Affidavit

of Mr. Mel Miles is denied.
2.

Plaintiff's first and second Objections to

Proposed Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law are denied.
3.

Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Ruling on

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied.
4.

The provisions of Article V of the

Professional Agreement entered into between the Davis
Education Association and the Davis County School District
on August 18, 1992 constitute an arbitration agreement
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subject to the Utah Arbitration Act.
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5.

That Plaintiff has waived his right to

arbitration in this matter.
6.

That Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be

and the same is hereby granted with prejudice.
DATED this

^ ^

day of February, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

KrtL*** y) -4^

RODNEY SJ PAGE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to:
Terry E. Welch, Esquire
Mark F. James, Esquire
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
Attorneys at Law
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P. O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
postage prepaid, this

{J_^

day of February, 1994.
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FELSHAW KING, Esquire (#1818)
KING & KING
Attorneys for Defendants
330 North Main Street
P. 0. Box 320
Kaysville, Utah 84037
Telephone: (801) 543-2288
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Of
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GARY E. REED,
AFFIDAVIT OF MEL MILES,
DIRECTOR OF HUMAN
RESOURCES OF DAVIS
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Civil NO. 930700200CV
Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
(ss.
COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

On the 8th day of October, 1993, personally
appeared before me MEL MILES, Director of Human Resources of
the Davis County School District, who after having been duly
sworn upon his oath did depose and say:
1.

That Affiant is and for eight (8) years has

been Director of Human Resources of the Davis County School
District.
2.
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That Affiant is personally acquainted with

Gary Reed and the claim made by Mr* Reed et als. alleging

that the medical insurance program of the Davis School
District for the school year 1992-1993 was unlawfully
discriminatory against married couples, both of whom were
employed by the School District.
3.

On or about August 18, 1992 the Board of

Education of Davis County School District entered into a
"Professional Agreement" with the Davis Education
Association for the 1992-93 school year.
The Professional Agreement was formulated through
a process of negotiation and includes the insurance program
complained of in Plaintiff's Complaint.

The insurance

program is set forth in paragraph 4.2 of the Professional
Agreement.
4.

The Board of Education has recognized the

Davis Education Association as the exclusive representative
for the professional employees for the term of the
Professional Agreement, that is, for the 1992-93 school
year.
5.

Affiant states upon information and belief

that Mr. Reed was a member of the Davis Education
Association (DEA) at the time the Professional Agreement was
negotiated and adopted.

Mr. Reed signed a Membership

Enrollment Form with the DEA.

The Membership Enrollment

Form contains a provision which states:
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I hereby designate and empower the local
association (DEA) as my exclusive
bargaining agent.
6.

Affiant is personally aware of the fact that

Gary Reed et als. filed claims against the School District
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division, a Division of
the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, on or about
November 10, 1992, alleging that the insurance program of
the School District was unlawfully discriminatory.
7.

Affiant is personally aware of the fact that

many hours of time were spent by School District personnel
in responding to the claims filed by Gary Reed et als. with
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and that a
considerable amount of legal research and preparation was
necessitated by such claims.
8.

Affiant is personally aware of the fact that

all of the claims filed by Gary Reed et als. with the Utah
Anti-Discrimination Division were adjudged and adjudicated
by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division to be without merit
and that all such claims were ordered dismissed.
9.

Affiant is further personally aware of the

fact that Gary Reed et als. filed an action in the District
Court of Davis County, State of Utah, against the Industrial
Commission of the State of Utah, and the Davis School
District alleging, inter aliaf that the Findings and
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Decision

of the Utah Anti-Discrimination

Division

were

erroneous.
The School District was required to expend
additional time and effort in connection with preparation of
the defense of the action in District Court and such defense
required additional legal research and the filing of a
Motion to Dismiss accompanied by an extensive Memorandum of
Law in Support of the School District's Motion to Dismiss.
10.

The School District's Memorandum of Law in

Support of Motion to Dismiss raised several defenses to the
Plaintiffs claim, including the defense of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
11.

It was not until after the School District

filed its Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law that Gary
Reed et als. filed a Notice of Dismissal in the District
Court action.
12.

Affiant assisted in negotiating the

Professional Agreement between the Board of Education of the
Davis County School District and the Davis Education
Association and is personally familiar with the contents and
provisions of such Professional Agreement.
13.

The Professional Agreement does not contain

any provision pertaining to arbitration.

In fact, the

Professional Agreement is a document consisting of
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approximately fifty (50) pages and the words "arbitration"
4

•-A
vP
\

and "arbitrator" are not even used or contained in the
Professional Agreement.
14.

The Professional Agreement contains Article

V, entitled "Grievance Procedure".

There is no provision in

the Grievance Procedure for arbitration.

The Board of

Education retains ultimate authority for deciding any
grievance filed under the terms of the Professional
Agreement.
15.

The Davis School District does not now have,

and to the best of my knowledge never has had, any
agreement, written or otherwise, agreeing to submit any
issue to arbitration or any process resembling arbitration.
16.

Mr.

Reed's

initial

objection

to

the

insurance program of the School District was filed under
Step 1 of the Grievance Procedure on or about May 21, 1993,
more than six (6) months after he filed his Complaint with
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division.

He followed with a

Complaint in the District Court after an adverse ruling by
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division.

This Complaint was

filed in April 28, 1993, nearly one (1) month before
Plaintiff made his first effort to follow the Grievance
Procedure.

This all occurred approximately nine

(9)

months after the Professional Agreement was approved by Mr.
Reed's bargaining agent.
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It was not until almost three

(3) weeks after the School District filed a Motion to
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Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in the District Court case
that Mr. Reed attempted to follow the Grievance Procedure.
17.

As a result of the Complaints filed by Mr.

Reed, the School District has been required to respond and
in doing so has utilized the time of Dr. Richard E. Kendell,
Superintendent of Schools,

Dr. Stephen F. Ronnenkamp,

Assistant Superintendent of Schools, Mr. Roger C. Glines,
Business Administrator, Mr. Mel Miles, Director of Human
Resources, M s . Becky Robinson, Assistant Director of Human
Resources,

Mr. Richard Lemon, Director of Data Processing,

and technicians and secretaries.

The total time spent by

the Administration is approximately 120 hours in connection
with Mr. Reed's claims.

The expense incurred by the School

District in connection with Mr. Reed's claims, including the
time of school administrators and personnel and legal fees,
exceeds Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00).

This time and

expense includes meetings with Mr. Reed, responding to the
claims filed with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and
defending the first action filed by Mr. Reed in the District
Court of Davis County.
18.

Further Affiant saith not.

DATED the day and year first above written.
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MEL MALES
£
Director of Human Resources
O

Subscribed and sworn to before me the day and year
first above written.
/?
PATRICIA K. BARBER

(SEAIW

NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE of UTAH
251 EAST 200 SOUTH
CLEARFIELD. UT 84037

COMM. EXP. 12-16-96

M

NOTARY PUBLIC

,
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Residing at: ^^kLc'-^^y

/
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My Commission Expires: /^L- //• -J^*

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MEL MILES, DIRECTOR OF
HUMAN RESOURCES, to:
Mark F. James, Esquire
Terry E. Welch, Esquire
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
Attorneys at Law
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P. O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
postage prepaid, this 8th day of October, 1993.
&^*t>C*t

__i!"~ * > < - -«•*•—**

Secretary
SiReedAFF.mm
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(b) The bureau may only release identifying
information to an adult adoptee or adult sibling
when it receives requests from both the adoptee
and his adult sibling
(c) After matching the request of an adult
adoptee with that of his adult sibling, if the bureau has been provided with sufficient information to make that match, the bureau shall notify
both the adoptee and the adult sibling that the
requests have been matched, and disclose the
identifying information to those parties
(3) Information registered with the bureau under
this section is available only to a registered adult
adoptee and his registered birth parent or registered
adult sibling, under the terms of this section
(4) Information regarding a birth parent who has
not registered a request with the bureau may not be
disclosed
(5) T h e b u r e a u m a y c h a r g e a fee for services provided u n d e r this section, limited to t h e cost of providing those services
1992
78-30-19.

Restrictions on disclosure of information — Violations — Penalty.
(1) Information maintained or filed with the bureau under this chapter may not be disclosed except
as provided by this chapter, or pursuant to a court
order
(2) Any person who discloses information obtained
from the bureau's voluntary adoption registry in violation of this chapter, or knowingly allows that information to be disclosed in violation of this chapter is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor
19$7
CHAPTER 31
ARBITRATION
(Repealed by Laws 1986, ch. 128, ^ 1.)
78-31-1 to 78-31-22.

Repealed.

CHAPTER 31a
ARBITRATION ACT
Section
78-31a-l
78-31a-2
78-3la-3
78-31a-4
78-3la-5
78-3la-6
78-31a-7
78-3la-8
78-3 la-9
78-31a-10
78-31a-ll
78-31a-12
78-3la-13
78-31a-14
78 3la-15
78-31a-16
78-31a-17
78-3la-18
78-31a-19
78-31a-20

Short title
Definitions
Arbitration agreement
Court order to arbitrate
Appointment of arbitrators
Conference prior to arbitration hearing
Arbitration hearing — Procedure
Arbitration hearing — Powers of arbitrators
Arbitration hearing — Joinder of parties
Arbitration award
Costs
Confirmation of award
Modification of award by arbitrators
Vacation of the award by court
Modification of award by court
Award as judgment
Motions
Location for arbitration
Appeals
Scope of chapter

78-3 la-6

78-31a-l. Short title.
This act shall be known as the 'Utah Arbitration
Act"
1985
78-31a-2. Definitions.
(1) "Arbitrators" means one or more arbitrators as
appointed by the court or agreed upon by the parties
(2) "Court" means any state district court in Utah
1985

78-31a-3. Arbitration agreement.
A written agreement to submit any existing or fu
ture controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable,
and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law
or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is
alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
1985
78-3 la-4. Court order to arbitrate.
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing
the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order
the parties to arbitrate If an issue is raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the
scope of the matters covered by the agreement, the
court shall determine those issues and order or deny
arbitration accordingly
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement is involved in an action
or proceeding pending before a court having jurisdiction to hear motions to compel arbitration, the motion
shaU be made to that court Otherwise, the motion
shall be made to a court with proper venue
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration
stays any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement However, if
the issue is severable from the other issues in the
action or proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed If a motion is made in an action or
proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a
stay of the action or proceeding
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not
be grounded on a claim that an issue subject to arbi
tration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for the
claim have not been shown
1985
78-31a-5. Appointment of arbitrators.
(1) If the arbitration agreement specifies a procedure for appointment of arbitrators, it shall be followed
(2) If no procedure is specified, or if the agreed
method fails or cannot be followed for any reason or
if an arbitrator fails or is unable to act, any party to
the arbitration agreement may move the court to ap
point one or more arbitrators, as necessarv
(3) The motion shall state
(a) the issues to be aibitrated,
(b) any arbitrators the party may propose for
appointment, and
(c) the qualifications of any proposed arbitra
tors
(4) Upon this motion the court shall appoint the
necessary arbitrators, whom the court shall find qual
lfied to arbitrate the issues stated in the motion 198">
78-31a-6.

Conference prior to arbitration hearing.
(1) The arbitrators either in their discretion, or at
the request of any party, may conduct a conference
prior to the arbitration hearing The conference shall
be held no fewer than ten days before the arbitration
hearing Notice of the conference shall be made by
certified mail to all parties to the arbitration hearing,
and no fewer than ten days before the conference

78-31a-7
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(2) The subpoena powers provided in Section
78-3la-8 apply to conferences conducted under this
section
(3) The conference shall allow the parties to con
sider any matters which may aid in the disposition of
the arbitration hearing, including, but not limited to
(a) identifying and clarifying the issues,
(b) determining the scope and scheduling of
discovery of evidence under Section 78-3la-7,
(c) stipulating to the admission of facts and
documents,
(d) identity of witnesses
(4) The arbitrators shall make a written record of
action taken at the conference, including a finding of
any agreements made between the parties regarding
matters discussed This finding controls at the arbitration hearing, unless the arbitrators find that a
modification at the hearing is necessary to prevent a
manifest injustice
1985
78-3la-7. Arbitration hearing — Procedure.
(1) The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place
for the arbitration hearing and serve each party to
the proceeding with notice of the time and place, personally or by certified mail Notice shall be served not
fewer than 30 days before the date of hearing, unless
both parties stipulate to a waiver or modification of
this notice requirement Appearance at the hearing
waives the notice required by this section The arbitrators may adjourn the hearing from time to time as
necessary, and on request of a party or upon their
own motion may postpone the hearing to a date not
later than the date fixed by the arbitration agreement for making the award, unless the parties consent to a later date The arbitrators shall hear and
determine the controversy upon the evidence produced, notwithstanding that a party duly notified
fails to appear The court upon motion may direct the
arbitrators to proceed promptly with the hearing and
determination of the controversy
(2) Each party to the arbitiation proceeding is entitled, in person or through counsel, to be heard, to
present evidence material to the controversy, and to
cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing
(3) The hearing shall be recorded in a manner
agreed upon by the parties Costs of making a record
shall be apportioned as directed by the arbitrators
(4) The hearing shall be conducted by all the arbitrators, but a simple majority of them may determine
any questions and render a final award If during the
course of the hearing an arbitrator for any reason
ceases to act, the remaining arbitrator or arbitrators
may continue the hearing and determination of the
controversy, or additional arbitrators may be ap
pointed as provided in Section 78 31a 5
(5) Unless otherwise provided by the arbitration
agreement or by law, the powers of the arbitratois
are exercised by majority vote
1985
78-3la-8.

Arbitration hearing — Powers of arbitrators.
(1) Arbitrators may administer oaths and issue
subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses or the pro
duction of books, records, documents, and other evidence Subpoenas shall be served, and upon motion to
the court by a party or the arbitrators, enforced as
provided by law for the service and enforcement of
subpoenas in civil actions
(2) The arbitrators either in their discretion, or at
the request of any party, may order
(a) a party to provide any other party with information which is determined by the arbitrator
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to be relevant to the determination of the issues
to be arbitrated, or
(b) the use of requests for discovery as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, except that the time a party has to respond to any
discovery request shall be determined by the arbitrators in their discretion
(3) Any law compelling a person under subpoena to
testify is applicable to this chapter
(4) The same fees prescribed for the attendance of
witnesses in civil actions shall be paid to witnesses
subpoenaed in arbitration proceedings
1985
78-3la-9.

Arbitration hearing — Joinder of parties.
(1) Upon motion to the arbitration panel by any
party, a person who is subject to service of process for
the subject matter of the arbitration, and who is a
party to the arbitration agreement, shall be joined as
a party in the action if (a) in his absence complete
relief cannot be accorded among those who are already parties, or (b) he claims or the motion alleges
he has an interest relating to the subject of the action
and the disposition of the action in his absence impedes his ability to protect that interest, or subjects
any of the persons already parties to a substantial
risk of incurred multiple or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reasons of his claimed interest
(2) Any person joined as a party to the arbitration
has the same time to answer as was given to the
initial! defendant in the case
1985
78-31a-10. Arbitration award.
(1) The arbitration award shall be in writing and
signed by the arbitrators who join in the award A
copy of the award shall be served upon each party
personally, or by certified mail, or as otherwise provided by the arbitration agreement
(2) An arbitration award shall be made within the
time set by the agreement or if a time is not set,
within a time the court orders pursuant to the motion
of any party to the arbitration proceeding The parties may at any time, by wntten agreement, extend
the time for award A party to an arbitration proceeding waives any objection based on the ground that the
award was not timely rendered unless the arbitrators
are notified of the objection before service of the
award
1985
78-31a-ll. Costs.
The expenses fees, and other costs of the arbitrators, exclusive of attorney s fees, shall be paid as provided in the award, unless another provision for the
payment of fees is made in the arbitration agreement
1985

78-3la-12. Confirmation of award.
Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration proceeding for the confirmation of the award,
and 20 days notice to all parties, the court shall confirm the award unless a motion is timely filed to vacate or modify the award
1985
78-31a-13.

Modification of award by arbitrators.
(1) Upon motion of any party to the arbitrators or
upon order of the court pursuant to a motion, the
arbitrators may modify the award if
(a) there is an evident miscalculation of figui*es or description of a person or property referred to in the award,
(b) the award is imperfect as to form, or
(c) necessary to clarify any part of the award
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(2) A motion to the arbitrators for modification of
an award shall be made within 20 days after service
of the award upon the moving party Written notice
that a motion has been made shall be promptly
served personally or by certified mail upon all other
parties to the proceeding The notice of motion for
modification shall contain a statement that objections
to the motion be served upon the moving party withi^
ten days after receipt of the notice Any award modi
fied by the arbitrators is subject to the provisions of
Sections 78-31a-ll, 78-31a-12, and 78-31a-14
i985
78-3la-14. Vacation of the award by court.
(1) Upon motion to the court by any party to the
arbitration proceeding for vacation of the award, the
court shall vacate the award if it appears
(a) the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or other undue means,
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral^
showed partiality, or an arbitrator was guilty of
misconduct that prejudiced the rights of any
party,
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the
hearing upon sufficient cause shown, refused to
hear evidence material to the controversy, or othu
erwise conducted the hearing to the substantial
prejudice of the rights of a party, or
(e) there was no arbitration agreement be
tween the parties to the arbitration proceeding
(2) A motion to vacate an award shall be made to
the court within 20 days after a copy of the award i$
served upon the moving party, or if predicated upor\
corruption, fraud, or other undue means, within 20
days after the grounds are known or should hav^
been known
(3) If an award is vacated on grounds other than ir\
Subsection (l)(e), the court may order a rehearing
before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the arbis
tration agreement or by the court Arbitrators chosen
by the court shall be found qualified to arbitrate th$
issues involved The time for making an award, if
specified in the arbitration agreement, is applicable
to a rearbitration proceeding If not specified, th$
court shall order the award upon rearbitration to b^
made within a reasonable time The time for making
an award under a rearbitration proceeding corns
mences on the date of the court's order fo*>
rearbitration
(4) If the motion to vacate is denied and no motion,
to modify or correct the award is pending, the court
shall confirm the award
198$
78-31a-15. Modification of award by court.
(1) Upon motion made within 20 days after a copy
of the award is served upon the moving party, the
court shall modify or correct the award if it appears
(a) there was an evident miscalculation of fig
ures or an evident mistake in the description of
any person or property referred to in the award,
(b) the arbitrators' award is based on a matter
not submitted to them, if the award can be cor
rected without affecting the merits of the award
upon the issues submitted, or
(c) the award is imperfect as to form
(2) If the motion is granted, the court shall modify
and correct the award and confirm it as modified and
corrected Otherwise, the court shall deny the motion
and confirm the award of the arbitrators
(3) A motion to modify or correct an award may be
joined in the alternative with a motion to vacate the
award
1985

78-3lb-l

78-3la-16. Award as judgment.
An award which is confirmed, modified, or corrected by the court shall be treated and enforced in
all respects as a judgment Costs incurred incident to
any motion authorized by this chapter, including a
reasonable attorney's fee, unless precluded by the arbitration agreement, may be awarded by the court
1985

78-31a-17. Motions.
(1) Notice of an initial motion for an order of arbitration shall be served as provided by law for the
service of a summons, unless otherwise specified by
the parties in the arbitration agreement
(2) A motion to the court or the arbitrators shall be
made and heard as provided by law for motions in
civil actions, except as otherwise specified in this
chapter
(3) Notice in w r i t i n g of t h e motion shall be served
on t h e adverse p a r t y as provided by law for civil actions
1985
78-31a-18. Location for arbitration.
If an arbitration agreement provides that arbitration be held in a specified county, the district court of
that county has jurisdiction to hear the initial motion
for arbitration If no provision is made, hearing on
the initial motion for arbitration shall be before the
district court of the county where the adverse party
resides or has a place of business or, if the adverse
party has no residence or place of business in this
state, in the county in which the adverse party is
served Unless the court with jurisdiction otherwise
orders, all subsequent motions or hearings incident to
the arbitration proceeding shall be heard by the court
hearing the initial motion
1985
78-31a-19. Appeals.
An appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as
provided by law for appeals in civil actions from any
court order
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration,
(2) granting a motion to stay arbitration,
(3) confirming or denying confirmation of an
arbitration award,
(4) modifying or correcting an award, or
(5) vacating an award without directing
rearbitration
1985
78-31a-20. Scope of c h a p t e r .
This chapter is not intended to provide a means of
arbitration exclusive of those sanctioned under common law
1985
CHAPTER 31b
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
bection
78 31b-l
78 31b-2
78-31b-3
78-31b-4
78-31b-5
78-31b-6
78-31b-7
78-31b-8

Definitions
Court authority and parties' participation
Procedure for court referral
Reporting of court ADR referrals
ADR agreement enforcement
Tolling of time requirements
Confidentiality
Liabilities of ADR provider

78-31b-l. Definitions.
(1) "ADR" means alternative dispute resolution
(2) "Arbitration" means the procedures in Title 78,
Chapter 31a, Utah Arbitration Act

